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1. Introduction 
Negotiation is a form of interaction among autono-
mous agents in which a group of agents with a desire 
to cooperate but with potentially conflicting interests 
seek to reach an agreement on a set of issues [5,12,20]. 
A negotiation issue can be any good, service, scarce re-
source, or unique capability that one agent can provide 
to another agent for a reward. A negotiation may ad-
dress multiple issues or only one issue at a time. In this 
paper we focus on multi-issue negotiations on task and 
resource allocation in cooperative problem solving. 
An agent that encounters a problem may initiate 
1-to-many negotiations and concurrently negotiate 
with multiple agents over resources or services (capa-
bilities). During negotiations, both the agent that ini-
tiates negotiations (i.e., the initiating agent) and each 
peer agent that responds to a negotiation request (i.e., 
the responding agent) may need to use short-term tac-
tics guided by long-term strategies to reach an agree-
ment acceptable to both sides. This need is particularly 
prominent in resource-constrained, complex environ-
ments: any misuse of negotiation resources for solv-
ing a present task could potentially prevent the agent 
from handling subsequent tasks. Conducting effective 
and efficient negotiations in complex environments is 
difficult. Complex environments that we consider in 
this paper are dynamic, uncertain, and real-time. The 
initial states that trigger the agents’ negotiation pro-
cess in the first place may dynamically change while 
the negotiation process is still on-going. The negotia-
tion outcome is uncertain such that a negotiation car-
ried out in the same manner does not always yield the 
same results at different times. Also, each negotiation 
is time-constrained such that an agreement reached past 
a deadline specified for a task is not acceptable. If an 
agent simply reacts when it negotiates in such an en-
vironment, it will not be able to plan to conserve its 
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resources for later tasks. If an agent only looks at the 
big picture, it might not be able to meet the individ-
ual needs and behaviors of the different agents en-
countered during negotiations. The problem is com-
pounded when there are multiple issues at hand and 
an initiating agent needs to conduct multiple, con-
current negotiations with more than one responding 
agent. Should the initiating agent negotiate with as 
many responding agents as possible as long as it has 
the resources to do so, thus possibly starving itself of 
those resources if a new task appears? Should the ini-
tiating agent identifies the best responding agent and 
tries to persuade that agent to take care of all issues, 
with the risk that if the negotiation falls through, the 
initiating agent would have to start the process with 
another responding agent, thus losing valuable time? 
What should the strategy be? 
We propose an adaptive, confidence-based negotia-
tion strategy, first described in [17]. Briefly, after iden-
tifying a set of capable peers for a particular task at 
hand, the initiating agent then decides how to conduct 
its multiple, concurrent negotiations. If the initiating 
agent is confident in a peer’s consistency, then it uses a 
packaged approach; otherwise, a pipelined approach. 
In a pipelined approach, the two negotiating agents ne-
gotiate on one issue at a time. In a packaged approach, 
the two agents negotiate on multiple issues during one 
negotiation. Using the pipelined approach, the initiat-
ing agent can switch remaining, yet-to-be-negotiated 
issues to other peers that have completed their nego-
tiations with the initiating agent. This allows the ini-
tiating agent to be more efficient and effective. With 
the packaged approach, the initiating agent has the ad-
vantage of likely reaching agreements sooner on all the 
pertinent issues of its task at hand, and using fewer re-
sources for negotiation. Therefore, the proposed strat-
egy chooses to use the pipelined approach if the initiat-
ing agent is not confident in its profile of its peers, and 
the packaged approach if it is. If the agent has a mixed 
set of confidence in its peers, then it chooses a hybrid 
set of pipelined and packaged approaches. 
To evaluate the adaptive, confidence-based negotia-
tion strategy, we incorporate the strategy into a Multi-
Phase Coalition Formation (MPCF) framework [15,16]. 
Our experiments compare the performance of the 
adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy with 
the purely pipelined strategy and the purely packaged 
strategy and show that the confidence-based one out-
performs the others. We also investigate how our strat-
egy affects the process (efficiency) and the outcome 
(effectiveness) of negotiations under different environ-
mental conditions. 
Note that the focus of this paper is on strategic ne-
gotiations instead of detailed negotiation tactics. Spe-
cifically, we focus on the initiating agent’s negotiation 
strategy on how to conduct concurrent 1-to-many ne-
gotiations with multiple issues. Here, a negotiation 
strategy does not deal with how each negotiation be-
tween agents should proceed at each interaction step; 
instead, it manages how the concurrent negotiations 
should be conducted in terms of scheduling and as-
signing different issues to different peer agents. 
Note also that this paper is a significant extension of 
[17], with more detailed discussions on the design of 
the proposed strategy and additional experiments and 
insights. The framework of the learning-based Multi-
Phase Coalition Formation was first proposed in [15] 
and then further described in [16]. In this paper, we 
briefly present the framework in Section 3 to provide a 
context for the proposed strategy. 
2. Related work 
The research on negotiations can be classified into 
two categories: tactical negotiations and strategic negoti-
ations. Tactical negotiations research focuses on how to 
conduct a negotiation with the step-by-step negotiation 
tactics. The typical approaches include (1) the game-the-
oretic and auction-based mechanisms (e.g., [13]) that 
focus on analyzing the interaction as a game between 
identical participants, and seeking its equilibrium, (2) 
the heuristic-based bargaining mechanisms (e.g., [3]) 
that are used in cases where it is not possible to reach 
the optimal outcome due to resource limitations, dy-
namic environment or incomplete information, and are 
mainly based on empirical testing and evaluation, and 
(3) the argumentation-based approaches (e.g., [8]) that 
allow agents to exchange meta-information about pro-
posals and counterproposals. Since this paper focuses 
on strategic negotiation, the following discussions are 
primarily on strategic and hybrid negotiations. 
2.1. Strategic negotiation 
In general, strategic negotiation addresses the man-
agement of negotiations such as conflict resolution, re-
source allocation, preference concerns, concurrent ne-
gotiation coordination, and so on. In some applications 
where agents are not completely autonomous, negotia-
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tions between agents have to be coordinated by a cen-
tral arbitrator to resolve the conflict (e.g., [19]). In some 
applications where there are resource constraints, stra-
tegic negotiations are employed to allocate resources 
more efficiently (e.g., [6,7]). In some applications 
where agents have special preferences like optional ne-
gotiation order, strategic negotiations are employed to 
address the preferences (e.g., [4]). In our applications 
we employ strategic negotiation to manage multiple 
concurrent negotiations. 
Sycara [19] presents a model of strategic negotiation 
that combines case-based reasoning and optimization 
of the multi-attribute utilities of agents, to resolve the 
adversarial conflicts in the domain of labor relations. 
An interesting component here is the use of a central-
ized arbitrator to handle the disagreements between 
agents. This centralized arbitrator essentially acts as 
the strategist as it has the knowledge of all disagree-
ments and the goings-on in the environment, and thus 
has the capacity to match-make or even coordinate ne-
gotiations to resolve disagreements. However, it is a 
bottleneck, and its view of the environment may be too 
broad to effectively address an agent’s needs. Our pro-
posed solution does not use such a centralized arbi-
trator. The agents make decisions autonomously in a 
peer-to-peer manner. Moreover, our strategy is aimed 
to compromise the advantages of different negotia-
tion approaches to improve both effectiveness and effi-
ciency in negotiation, rather than simply seek the opti-
mal negotiation outcome. 
Kraus et al. [6,7] study strategic negotiation to im-
prove the negotiation efficiency, specifically the ne-
gotiation time, similar to our work. They focus on the 
passage of time and the preferences of the players for 
different agreements as well as for opting out of the 
negotiations. They assume agents have complete in-
formation about others. Different from their work, our 
confidence-based negotiation strategy focuses on the 
management of concurrent negotiations. Agents try to 
reduce the overall negotiation time by choosing appro-
priate negotiation approaches, instead of by reducing 
the step-by-step negotiation time. Agents are aimed to 
improve both negotiation effectiveness and efficiency 
at the same time. Moreover, our agents only have in-
complete information about others. They take the stra-
tegic negotiations based on the confidence in nego-
tiation partners’ consistent behaviors instead of the 
preference, to adapt to the complex environment. 
Most similar to our work, Fatima et al. [4] focus on 
bilateral multi-issue strategic negotiation. The outcome 
of negotiation depends on two key factors: the agenda 
(i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negoti-
ation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed to-
gether or separately). The authors determine the equi-
librium strategies for two negotiation procedures and 
the corresponding negotiation outcomes. For those 
outcomes, the authors further identify the conditions 
for which agents have identical preferences over the 
optimal agenda and procedure, and use those to reach 
agreements. The two negotiation procedures, issue-by-
issue and package deal, are similar to ours. However, a 
key difference is that our initiating agent manages con-
current negotiations rather than only one bilateral ne-
gotiation. We also focus on possible issue switching 
rather than re-arranging the negotiation order. Our 
agents decide negotiation strategies based on the confi-
dence in other agents’ behavior in dynamic and uncer-
tain environments, rather than the preferences or con-
straints as in [4]. Finally, in our framework, the agents 
learn over time the appropriate negotiation approach 
to improve negotiation outcome and reduce negoti-
ation time cost in complex environments, instead of 
finding the optimal negotiation strategy (or outcome). 
2.2. Combination of tactical negotiation and strategic 
negotiation 
In complex negotiation environments where both 
negotiation tactics and negotiation management are 
critical, combining tactical negotiation and strategic 
negotiation is necessary. In such environments, tactical 
negotiations are needed for agents to conduct step-by-
step negotiation tactics while strategic negotiations are 
needed to manage negotiations. Approaches are such 
as the preference-driven approach (e.g., [14]), the heu-
ristic approach (e.g., [11]), the utility-based approach 
(e.g., [1]), and the syntax-dependent approach (e.g., 
[21]).We discuss these approaches in the following. 
Sierra et al. [14] combine tactical negotiation and 
strategic negotiation using a preference-driven ap-
proach in order to conduct many-to-many (i.e., multi-
ple initiating agents and multiple responding agents) 
negotiations on multiple issues. To achieve flexibility 
during negotiation, they set different weights for op-
tional negotiation tactics, allowing the varying impor-
tance of the criteria to be modeled over time. For ex-
ample, when the time resource is sufficient, the tactics 
that emphasize the behavior of other agents will be 
given greater preference than the tactics which base 
their values on the amount of time remaining. Thus 
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strategies combine tactics depending on the history of 
negotiations and the mental state of agents. Our work 
is similar to [14] in that both are concerned about time. 
However, we combine the strategy together with tac-
tics based on the environmental change rather than the 
preferences, being more adaptive to the complex en-
vironments. The combination of strategic negotiation 
and tactical negotiation in our work is loosely coupled, 
which provides better modularity and flexibility. 
Nguyen and Jennings [11] propose a heuristic ap-
proach to coordinate 1-to-many (i.e., one initiating 
agent and multiple responding agents) negotiations on 
a single issue. The initial strategy selection is based on 
the initiating agents’ beliefs about others, and the ne-
gotiation tactics of agents in individual negotiations 
depend on the negotiation status of the same issue. 
Since they do not consider multi-issue negotiations, 
there is no issue assignment work and no issue will 
be switched from the pipeline of one agent to another 
one, which is a key consideration in our work. 
Chevaleyre et al. [1] propose a utility-based ap-
proach to manage many-to-many negotiations on 
multiple issues. All agents involved in the concurrent 
negotiations model their preferences by means of tree-
structured utility functions. An identical protocol is 
used to guide the multilateral negotiations by modify-
ing the utility functions of each agent during negotia-
tions. As a result of a sequence of structurally simple 
deals, an agreement with the maximal utilitarian so-
cial welfare (i.e., the maximal sum of all pleasures) can 
be achieved. In our work we address the 1-to-many ne-
gotiations rather than the many-to-many negotiations. 
The objective of our strategy is to improve negotiation 
outcome and lower negotiation cost, rather than sim-
ply maximize the negotiation outcome. In our com-
plex environments, the means of tree-structured utility 
functions is not appropriate because it is time-consum-
ing for agents to update the complex utility functions 
adaptive to the dynamic and uncertain change of the 
environments. 
Zhang and Zhang [21] propose a negotiation solu-
tion based on the syntax-dependent formalism of be-
lief revision to address the bilateral negotiation. They 
combine the conflict resolution strategy together with 
the step-by-step negotiation tactics. Specifically they 
divide a negotiation procedure into two stages. In the 
first stage, two agents meet together to work out mu-
tually acceptable core demand from each side by step-
by-step. In the second stage, each agent adjusts its own 
demand in order to make it consistent with the consent 
reached in the first stage by conducting a course of be-
lief revision. The outcome of the negotiation is then the 
intersection of two agents’ revised demand sets. The 
combination of the two types of negotiations in their 
work is loosely coupled. Different from their work, 
we address the 1-to-many negotiations rather than 
the 1-to-1 negotiations. We use strategic negotiation to 
conduct effective and efficient concurrent negotiations 
rather than simply resolve conflicts. 
3. Framework 
Our overall framework is based on a model called 
the Multi-Phase Coalition Formation (MPCF) model. 
The model consists of three phases: coalition planning, 
coalition instantiation and coalition evaluation, as de-
picted in Figure 1. In coalition planning, the agent ap-
plies case-based reasoning (CBR) to obtain a coalition 
formation plan. In coalition instantiation, the agent car-
ries out the planned formation strategy through 1-to-
many negotiations with coalition candidates. In co-
alition evaluation, the agent evaluates the coalition 
formation process, the formed coalition structure (if a 
coalition is successfully formed), and the coalition exe-
cution outcome (if the coalition is executed eventually) 
to determine the utility of the planned strategy and re-
inforces the strategy. In the following, we briefly out-
line the MPCF model. For details on this model, please 
refer to [9,15,16]. For details on the tactical negotia-
tions, please refer to [10]. 
Figure 1. The Multi-Phase Coalition Formation (MPCF) model. 
Ad A p ti v e, c o n f i d e n c e-b AS e d S tr A teg i c n eg o ti A ti o n S i n c o mp L e X mu L ti A g en t e n v i r o n me n tS   317
3.1. Coalition formation phases 
In coalition planning, the coalition-initiating agent 
applies CBR to derive a specific coalition forma-
tion plan for the current problem based on a previ-
ous plan stored in the case-base. Given a problem (a 
task) to solve, the agent retrieves from its case-base 
the case with the most similar problem description 
to the current problem description. The agent then 
adapts the case solution, based on the differences be-
tween the two problem descriptions, to compose a co-
alition formation plan (see Section 3.2). Briefly, a plan 
is one that specifies guidelines for the agent on how 
to form the coalition, including the number of neigh-
bors to approach, the number of coalition candidates 
to maintain, time allocated for the formation process, 
and so on. 
The coalition instantiation phase implements the co-
alition formation plan to form a coalition. At first, the 
coalition-initiating agent normalizes the task— divid-
ing the task into separate execution units as different 
negotiation issues, computing the potential utilities of 
its peers, and ranking the peers based on the potential 
utilities. Then the agent concurrently negotiates with 
each selected peer agent on the set of subtasks in an at-
tempt to form the intended coalition. Each negotiation 
is argumentative where the initiating agent attempts 
to persuade the responding agent to perform a task or 
provide a resource by providing support or evidence 
for its request [18]. 
The coalition evaluation phase provides the basis 
for an agent to improve its coalition formation plans. 
This phase evaluates both the coalition instantiation 
process (in terms of time spent, number of messages 
used, number of peers approached, etc.) and the exe-
cution outcomes of the subtasks agreed upon in the co-
alition (in terms of the number of subtasks performed 
by highly-capable peers, etc.). In general, a good plan 
is one that uses little computational and communica-
tion resources with successful instantiations and sub-
sequent executions. 
3.2. Case-based reinforcement learning 
We employ an integrated case-based reinforcement 
learning strategy [16] to utilize the results of the eval-
uation phase to improve the coalition planning phase. 
As alluded to in the previous section, our coalition for-
mation framework relies on CBR to derive plans. Thus, 
the experience (or lessons learned) is stored in the 
cases. 
A case consists of a problem description, a solu-
tion, an outcome, and its utility. The problem descrip-
tion consists of an agent’s external and internal envi-
ronments and the task description. The solution gives 
a coalition formation plan which specifies (1) the num-
ber of coalition candidates, (2) the number of expected 
coalition members, (3) the time allocated for coalition 
instantiation, (4) the task allocation, and (5) the num-
ber of messages recommended. The outcome docu-
ments the coalition instantiation results among agents, 
subtasks’ execution results, and the evaluation values 
of the actual coalition formation process. The utility in-
dicates the quality of the case, specifically, the qual-
ity of the plan in addressing the coalition problem rep-
resented in the case. Coupling the evaluation and the 
problem description, the agent can learn a new coali-
tion formation case to increase its coverage of cases or 
can update the case’s utility using the evaluation result 
to reinforce the case. 
4. Confidence-based negotiation strategy 
We first proposed the adaptive, confidence-based 
negotiation strategy in [17]. We employ this strategy 
to facilitate the initiating agents to conduct concurrent, 
strategic negotiations, during the coalition instantia-
tion phase. Here we first present the motivations be-
hind such a strategy in Section 4.1. Then, we describe 
the assumptions about the multiagent environment 
that are necessary for the strategy to be beneficial in 
Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 4.3, we discuss the algo-
rithm for the strategy in details. 
4.1. Strategy rationale 
The objective of applying the proposed confidence-
based negotiation strategy during the coalition instan-
tiation phase is to help agents negotiate and form co-
alitions more effectively and more efficiently. It does 
not deal with how agents take step-by-step negotiation 
tactics; instead, it manages how the concurrent negoti-
ations should be conducted in terms of scheduling and 
assigning different issues to different coalition candi-
dates (here an issue refers to a subtask to be executed, 
especially the resource or capability required for the 
execution of that subtask). 
Let us first describe the two strategic negotiation ap-
proaches: (1) pipelined, and (2) packaged. To help us il-
lustrate the differences between the two approaches, 
suppose that at the end of the coalition planning 
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phase, the plan calls for the initiating agent ai to ap-
proach two coalition candidates aj and ak (i.e., agents 
that have been deemed to likely be able to help) to ne-
gotiate over several subtasks for task Tm. Specifically, 
suppose aj is allocated two subtasks T
1
m and T
3
m, and ak 
is allocated three subtasks T 2m, T
4
m, and T
5
m . 
In the pipelined approach, ai concurrently negotiates 
with aj and ak over one issue at a time, starting with T
1
m 
and T 2m, respectively. If the negotiation between ai and 
aj completes successfully, then ai initiates another ne-
gotiation with aj to discuss T
3
m, and so forth. Further, 
suppose that ai has successfully negotiated with aj to 
handle T1m and T
3
m. At this point, if ai realizes that (1) 
aj is capable of performing T
5
m, and (2) the negotiation 
between ai and ak is still over T
4
m, then ai can re-allo-
cate T 5m to aj and start another negotiation. Similarly, 
if a negotiation over an issue fails, ai will attempt to 
re-allocate that issue to another agent to try to salvage 
the coalition instantiation phase. That is, agent ai has 
the flexibility of dynamically changing the task set se-
lected for negotiations with ak. 
In the packaged approach, ai packages multiple is-
sues into one single negotiation. Using the same ex-
ample above, that means ai will initiate one negotia-
tion with aj, going over T
1
m and T
3
m in one shot, and 
another negotiation with ak, trying to resolve all three 
issues, T 2m, T
4
m, and T
5
m, at once. If two agents cannot 
reach an agreement on an issue, then the package to 
which the issue belongs fails as well. The last charac-
teristic indicates that a package is either to be accepted 
(after negotiation) or to be rejected, and cannot be ac-
cepted piecewise issue by issue. 
In complex environments that are dynamic, uncer-
tain, and real-time, agent behaviors are difficult to per-
ceive or predict accurately by other agents. For exam-
ple, an initiating agent ai may rank neighbor aj as the 
best candidate and expect to reach an agreement for 
its negotiation in a short time. However, it is possible 
that aj is busy and unable to entertain the negotiation 
request at that moment. Without a flexible manage-
ment strategy, ai would have to wait until aj is avail-
able, probably missing the time deadline requirement. 
It is also possible that, because of the dynamic nature 
that we assume of our environment, the ranking of a 
neighbor by an agent may change during a negotia-
tion and may thus require the agent to terminate the 
ongoing negotiation in favor of another. Thus we real-
ize that there is a need for a management strategy that 
is flexible, capable of adapting to the profiled behavior 
of the neighbors as well as the real-time observation of 
the negotiation activities. 
Comparing the two negotiation approaches, we see 
that the pipelined approach is more cautious, flexible, 
and opportunistic than the packaged approach. In the 
former, the initiating agent may dynamically redistrib-
ute an issue from the original pipeline to a “free and ca-
pable” pipeline of another coalition candidate. So the 
pipelined approach is preferred in uncertain and dy-
namic environments to increase the likelihood of suc-
cessful negotiations. On the other hand, packaging mul-
tiple issues into one negotiation may reduce the number 
of agents to approach and subsequently decrease com-
putational and communication overheads. So the pack-
aged approach may be preferred in resource-con-
strained, real-time environments. An initiating agent 
thus needs to determine when to use which negotiation 
approach with which responding agents, for different 
issues during the same coalition formation task. 
Note also that an initiating agent in our frame-
work decides which approach to take based on the 
confidence it has in what it has learned of each of its 
neighbors. This allows the agent to consider volatil-
ity or uncertainty in the environment under resource 
constraints. 
4.2. Assumptions on problem domain 
Our adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strat-
egy is based on the following three assumptions: 
Assumption 1 (Overlapping Capabilities Assump-
tion). We assume that in the multi-agent system, the 
agents have overlapping capabilities. This assumption 
facilitates the pipelined negotiation approach. If no 
agents share the same capabilities, then the pipelined 
approach will not have the flexibility to be opportunis-
tic, or the possibility to exploit the responding agents 
that have completed negotiations early. For example, if 
there is only one candidate that knows how to perform 
a subtask T1m, then the agent ai has no choice but to re-
serve T1m for that candidate. 
Assumption 2 (Efficient Multi-Issue Negotiation As-
sumption). We assume that packaging multiple issues 
into a negotiation is more efficient than negotiating 
each issue one by one. That means the resource cost 
required by the packaged negotiation is less than that 
by pipelined negotiation. Different from the pipelined, 
one-at-a-time negotiation—in which an initiating agent 
needs to send a request and a responding agent needs 
to inform the negotiation outcome issue-by-issue, in 
packaged negotiations, the agents request or inform 
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over all the issues at one time. This assumption basi-
cally indicates that by packaging issues into one single 
negotiation an initiating agent is able to reduce the ne-
gotiation overhead of the same set of issues, which in 
turn reduces the computational and communication 
costs (e.g., the coalition formation time and the com-
munication bandwidth). 
Assumption 3 (Additive Multi-Issue Negotiation Ar-
guments Assumption). We assume that to persuade a 
candidate (responding agent) to agree with a set of is-
sues, the amount of arguments (or messages) that the 
initiating agent has to provide for all the issues in the 
packaged approach is the same as the total amount of 
all the arguments that it has to provide for each of the 
issues separately in the pipelined approach. This as-
sumption supplements Assumption 2 in that the argu-
ments needed by each issue in the packaged approach 
are the same as those in the pipelined approach. But 
the overhead of the former is less than the latter. In 
some scenarios, this assumption may not hold as nego-
tiating multiple issues altogether may increase flexibil-
ity in reaching a compromise agreeable to both parties, 
and thus reducing the amount of arguments needed, at 
the expense of added reasoning capacity on the agents. 
Assumption 4 (Inter-Coalition Competition Assump-
tion). We assume that there is inter-coalition competi-
tion among coalition formation tasks. The inter-co-
alition competition may occur in different situations. 
First, concurrent coalition formation tasks compete for the 
communication resources of the same agent. Particularly, 
the same agent can be (i) a coalition-initiating agent 
that initiates multiple, concurrent coalition formation 
processes for these tasks, (ii) a responding agent that 
is approached for these concurrent tasks by different 
initiating agents, or (iii) a responding agent that is ap-
proached for these concurrent tasks of the same initi-
ating agent. Second, coalition formation tasks compete 
for the same capability (or problem-solving resource) of one 
same agent. Particularly, the tasks can be requested by 
different initiating agents, or those by the same initi-
ating agent, and overlap temporarily or functionally. 
Stemming from this intercoalition competition as-
sumption, we assume that each task has a priority such 
that an agent will be able to choose to perform the task 
or subtask most important to itself. 
Assumption 5 (Intra-Coalition Competition Assump-
tion). We assume that there is intra-coalition competi-
tion among different subtask (negotiation issues) of the 
same coalition formation task. The intracoalition com-
petition may occur in different situations: (1) when the 
coalition-initiating agent decides on the negotiation 
order of different subtasks that have been allocated 
to different neighbors, and (2) when the coalition-ini-
tiating agent requests for help from multiple agents 
for the same subtask. As a result of this assumption, 
we also assume that initiating agent will be able to se-
quence the negotiation issues according to their speci-
fied execution start times. We also further assume that 
the initiating agent has a degree of greediness that it ex-
ercises as an “insurance” policy. That is, if a subtask is 
of high priority, then to make sure that it will be able 
to get it solved, the initiating agent may choose to re-
quest from multiple agents that it knows to help solve 
the subtask. The “greedier” the initiating agent is, for 
example, the more agents it will approach. 
4.3. Strategy description 
The proposed adaptive, confidence-based negotia-
tion strategy works as follows. First, an initiating agent 
ai selects only agents that it knows to be capable of per-
forming the subtasks of a task to be solved as coalition 
candidates. Second, depending on the subtasks and 
the capabilities of the coalition candidates, ai allocates 
the subtasks as negotiation issues with specific coali-
tion candidate. These first two steps are as dictated 
by the derived coalition formation plan as a result of 
casa-based reasoning. Third, during the coalition in-
stantiation phase, ai decides to use either the pack-
aged or pipelined approach for each candidate based 
on its confidence in its perception of each coalition can-
didate’s capabilities. For example, if the behavior of a 
coalition candidate aj has been consistent as observed 
by ai—e.g., aj has always agreed to ai’s requests very 
quickly—then ai can anticipate that negotiating with 
aj over the new issues will likely lead to a high-utility 
outcome. However, if the behavior of aj has not been 
consistent as observed by ai, then ai may choose to be 
cautious and do not package all issues into one negoti-
ation with aj . 
An initiating agent ai computes its confidence value 
in a candidate aj in the following manner: 
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where Chpmai (aj , ts) is the value of the aj’s mth charac-
teristic related with coalition process, observed by ai at 
time ts (s ∈ [1, ]); and Chp
n
ai (aj , ts) is the value of one 
of aj ’s nth characteristic related with coalition outcome, 
observed by ai at time ts (s ∈ [1, ]). Further, Chp
m
ai (aj) 
and Chpnai (aj) are the corresponding means, and  is 
the window size of ai’s observation periods ( ≥ 1). A 
larger window size  means more interactions between 
the two agents and thus may lead to higher confidence 
in ai’s observations of aj . ωm and ωn are weights used to 
balance the values of the parameters related with coali-
tion process and coalition outcome respectively. ωChp 
and ωCho are the weights used to emphasize the role of 
the process or the outcome. A higher ωChp is preferred 
in highly resource-constrained, real-time environments 
to facilitate a negotiation approach that may incur less 
resource costs (e.g., time); on the other hand, a higher 
ωCho is preferred in highly uncertain environments to 
have a higher likelihood of securing a successful nego-
tiation outcome. 
Note that ai profiles aj ’s behavior with two sets of 
characteristics, the process set (Chp) and the outcome 
set (Cho). The process set pertains to the negotiation 
process and consists of (1) the tardiness degree of the 
candidate aj, indicating the time it takes aj to respond 
to a request by ai during negotiation (i.e., the aver-
age message round-trip-time between the two agents 
as observed by ai), (2) the hesitation degree of the can-
didate aj, indicating how ready aj is to agree to a re-
quest by ai (i.e., the amount of arguments that ai needs 
to provide to persuade aj), and (3) the busyness degree 
of the candidate aj (i.e., the number of on-going nego-
tiations between ai and aj at present). The outcome set 
pertains to the quality of the coalition outcome and 
consists of (1) the satisfaction degree of the candidate 
aj, indicating how much aj agrees to meet ai’s request 
(i.e., the negotiation utility of aj to ai for a particular is-
sue (or subtask)), and (2) the capability of the candidate 
aj, indicating how well aj is capable of executing the 
agreed subtask (i.e., the execution utility of aj to ai on 
a particular issue (or subtask)). Note that the satisfac-
tion degree is the upper bound on how well a subtask 
can be executed while capability is the actual observed 
quality of outcome. Due to the uncertainty in the en-
vironment, it is possible for the execution utility to be 
significantly less than the negotiation utility of a candi-
date to the initiating agent. 
Given the above definition of confidence, an ini-
tiating agent ai can choose to perform the pipelined 
approach with a candidate aj if Confai(aj) less than a 
threshold κ, and to perform the packaged approach 
otherwise. A low κ may be preferred to avoid being 
overly conservative and always negotiating with each 
candidate in the pipelined approach if significant gains 
can be obtained from the packaged approach. For ex-
ample, if the packaged approach significantly reduces 
the amount of arguments needed and therefore the 
time needed to negotiate successfully, then one may 
choose a low κ. On the other hand, in situations where 
task allocations are very dynamic and flexible, a high 
κ may be preferred to avoid being overly rigid and al-
ways negotiating with each candidate in the packaged 
approach. 
Ultimately, the coalition formation process is based 
on a plan and the plan may not work as expected dur-
ing the coalition instantiation process. Focusing only 
on the packaged approach vs. the pipelined approach, 
we see that it is possible for the initiating agent to lose 
contact with a candidate due to communication loss, 
agent faults, or extremely long communication de-
lay. In such a case, the initiating agent needs to have 
a contingency plan to persist with the coalition instan-
tiation process. In general, if the packaged approach is 
used, and a candidate is found to be non-responsive, 
then the agent may break up the package and distrib-
utes the issues to the remaining candidates in the co-
alition. For the pipelined approach, the response is 
more straightforward—simply transferring the issues 
to other pipelines. And, in the case where the initiat-
ing agent is stuck with a particular issue negotiating 
with a non-responsive candidate, the agent will dupli-
cate another negotiation with another candidate on the 
same issue and conduct the two negotiations in paral-
lel. Whichever negotiation completes successfully first 
will prompt the agent to terminate the other. 
5. Experimental results 
We implemented the adaptive, confidence-based 
negotiation strategy into the Multi-Phase Coalition 
Formation (MPCF) framework in a multiagent system. 
In the system, each agent has multiple overlapping ca-
pabilities and is capable of performing multiple tasks. 
When an agent encounters a task, it first analyzes 
whether it is able to solve the problem all by itself; if 
not, it initiates a coalition formation process. Each 
agent has 3 + N threads: (1) a core thread to manage 
tasks, reason, and learn, (2) a communication thread, (3) 
an execution thread for task simulation, and (4) N ne-
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gotiation threads for concurrent negotiations with other 
agents.  
In this paper, we report some experimental results 
aimed to quantitatively evaluate the adaptive, confi-
dence-based negotiation strategy in complex environ-
ments by comparing its performance with a purely 
packaged and a purely pipelined strategy. The purely 
packaged strategy is one where the initiating agent 
packages all issues allocated to each candidate and ne-
gotiates over them via one negotiation process. If the 
two agents cannot agree on any of the issues, the entire 
package is considered a failure. The initiating agent 
then approaches another candidate that is free and ca-
pable of addressing all the issues of the package. The 
purely pipelined approach is one where all issues are 
individually negotiated, and issues can be re-distrib-
uted to available pipelines as long as the candidates 
are capable of addressing those issues. 
We evaluate the performances in terms of coalition 
formation efficiency and effectiveness. The efficiency is 
measured in terms of the cost of the coalition forma-
tion process, while effectiveness is measured in terms 
of the quality of the outcome of the formed coalition. 
5.1. Experiment sets 
We have three experiment sets: EB1, EB2, and EB3, 
as shown in Table 1. There are three environment pa-
rameters that we vary for our experiments: 
(1) Dynamic range: This represents the range within 
which agents’ dynamic behavior varies. We have sim-
ulated a variety of dynamic ranges of the environment 
through setting different variation ranges of agents’ 
tardiness degrees, as defined previously in Section 4.3. 
Thus, this range describes a key characteristic of the 
negotiation process. As shown in Table 1, EB3 is the 
most dynamic while EB1 is the least dynamic. 
(2) Uncertainty range: This represents the range 
within which negotiation outcomes may vary given the 
same pair of agents and the same issues. Specifically, 
we simulate this range by varying agent’s satisfaction 
degrees, as defined in Section 4.3 above. This charac-
teristic has a direct impact on negotiation outcome. 
As shown in Table 1, a 1.0 means that the satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
degree is 100% (a full deal can be reached), a 0.2 means 
that it is only 20% (only a partial deal can be reached). 
Thus, EB3 is the most uncertain while EB1 is the least 
uncertain.   
(3) Real-time degree: This represents the time con-
straints in negotiations. Any negotiation that runs lon-
ger than its time limit is aborted, yielding a 0 for the 
outcome utility. Table 2 shows the actual time limit for 
each real-time degree. A degree of 0 indicates that the 
environment is non-real-time as the agents will have 
more than sufficient time to carry out their negotia-
tions. Thus, a degree of 1 is the least time-constrain-
ing while a degree of 6 is the most time-constraining. 
All three experiment sets have the same range of time 
constraints. 
Note that due to the real-time constraints, it is pos-
sible that an agent never gets around to tackle all sub-
tasks of a task. Thus, there will be subtasks that are not 
yet negotiated at the end of the time limit. For these 
subtasks, each will count as 0 towards the overall util-
ity of the task. In this manner, we not only keep track 
of failed negotiations, but also take into account nego-
tiations waiting in the task queue that an agent fails to 
initiate. 
5.2. Efficiency: Cost in negotiation processes 
To examine whether the confidence-based strat-
egy outperforms others in negotiation cost, we com-
pare each strategy’s average number of messages sent 
for negotiations per task, and average negotiation time 
per task in non-real-time environments (ES1, ES2, 
and ES3). We specify the negotiation time of a coalition 
Table 1. The experiment sets 
Experiment Sets  Dynamic Range  Uncertainty Range  Real-Time Degrees 
EB1  [RTTmin, 2 RTTmin]  [0.6, 1.0]  0 ~ 6 
EB2  [RTTmin, 2.5 RTTmin]  [0.4, 1.0]  0 ~ 6 
EB3  [RTTmin, 3 RTTmin]  [0.2, 1.0]  0 ~ 6  
Table 2. Real-time environmental settings 
Real-Time Degrees                               Time Limits (ticks) 
0  50000 
1  27500 
2  25000 
3  22500 
4  20000 
5  17500 
6  15000  
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formation task from the moment when a coalition-
initiating agent begins to negotiate for the task to the 
moment when the agent receives the last outcome of 
negotiations. If the time limit comes first before all is-
sues (subtasks) are negotiated, then all ongoing ne-
gotiations will be aborted, and remaining issues that 
are yet-to-be-negotiated will also be removed. In this 
case, the negotiation time of the task is the time limit 
allocated to the task. Figure 2 shows the results over 
different real-time degrees, where PA represents the 
purely-packaged negotiation strategy, PI represents 
the purely-pipelined negotiation strategy, and CB rep-
resents the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation 
strategy, while Figure 3 shows the averaged results of 
the three strategies.   
In non-real-time environments, the number of mes-
sages sent for negotiations in each task depends pri-
marily on (1) the number of issues in the task, (2) the 
number of arguments required by each candidate, (3) 
the number of candidates approached with the pack-
aged or the pipelined strategy, and (4) the issues’ dis-
tribution pattern among the candidates. The envi-
ronment’s dynamism or uncertainty is relatively a 
nonimpact, since the agents have ample time to carry 
out their negotiations and to re-distribute issues to ob-
tain the best deals. From Figure 3(a), we observe that 
the confidence-based strategy needed more messages 
than the purely packaged, but fewer messages than 
the purely pipelined. This result is expected. First, 
with Assumption 3, the only way for the packaged 
approach to outperform the pipelined approach is its 
ability of lowering message overhead as agents using 
the packaged approach deal with fewer requests. As a 
result, PA outperforms CB, and CB outperforms PI.  
Figure 2. Comparison on negotiation time in EB1, EB2, and 
EB3, from the less dynamic and uncertain to the more dy-
namic and uncertain environments. PA = purely-packaged, PI 
= purely-pipelined, and CS = confidence-based.
Figure 3. Comparison on negotiation cost: (a) message cost, 
and (b) time cost. PA = purely-packaged, PI = purely-pipe-
lined, and CS = confidence-based.  
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From Figs 2 and 3(b), we observe that in all three 
experiment sets, the average negotiation time of tasks 
in PI is always the highest. Note that in CB, the agents 
choose when to use a mixture of packaged and pipe-
lined approaches when forming coalitions. Since it is 
evident that the CB outperforms PI, that implies that 
the agents are able to make the correct decisions—
picking the right candidates to use the pipelined or 
packaged approach—to improve their efficiency. 
Furthermore, in non-real-time environments (i.e., 
when real-time degree is 0), when the environment 
is more dynamic and uncertain (moving from EB1 to 
EB3), the average negotiation time for PA increases, 
while it decreases for both PI and CB. Upon closer 
analysis, we realize that when the environment is more 
dynamic and uncertain (as in EB2 and EB3), it is more 
likely for a candidate to possibly respond more slowly. 
That results in more chances for some issues waiting 
in the pipelines to be moved from slow-progressing 
pipelines to the fast-progressing ones, if the latter have 
empty slots in the schedule of the pipelines. The non-
critical time constraint also makes these switches pos-
sible. This thus results in the lower values of negotia-
tion times observed for PI and CB. This implies that in 
more dynamic and uncertain environments, a design 
that incorporates some pipelined approach can outper-
form a purely packaged one in negotiation efficiency. 
Interestingly, in EB1, EB2, and EB3, when the real-
time degrees of the environments are increased, the dif-
ference in the average negotiation time between CB and 
PA decreases. Especially when the real-time degree in-
creases from 4 to 6, the average negotiation time in the 
confidence-based strategy is almost equal to that in the 
purely-packaged strategy. Upon further analysis, we 
find that this is because when the time constraints be-
came more critical, more negotiations were aborted 
sooner so much so that moving issues around from one 
candidate to another was futile: there are simply not 
enough agents to handle all the necessary subtasks or is-
sues within the time limit. As a result, the difference is 
insignificant in negotiation time between CB and PA. 
Therefore, we see that the adaptive, confidence-
based negotiation strategy can outperform the purely 
packaged strategy in negotiation cost when the envi-
ronment is less real-time, and more dynamic and un-
certain; but cannot when the environment is less 
dynamic and uncertain. On the other hand, the confi-
dence-based strategy generally outperforms the purely 
pipelined strategy in terms of the average negotiation 
time in all non-real-time scenarios. That the agents us-
ing the confidence-based strategy are able to save time 
using packaged negotiations indicates that the en-
vironment is still consistent enough for the agents to 
make confident and useful profiles of their interactions 
with other agents. This also indicates that our experi-
ments do not identify a cutoff point above which the 
purely pipelined strategy will always outperform the 
confidence-based strategy. Ultimately, we hypothesize 
that when the environment is extremely dynamic and 
uncertain, the confidence-based strategy will conform 
to the purely pipelined one. 
5.3. Effectiveness: Negotiation outcome 
To examine whether the confidence-based strategy 
outperforms others in the quality of the negotiation 
outcome, we compare each strategy’s average negoti-
ation outcome utility of all the tasks in the experiment 
sets, shown in Figure 4. Note that the outcome utility 
reported is the average of all 99 tasks negotiated, and 
each task’s negotiation outcome utility is the average 
of the satisfaction degree achieved for each of its issues 
(subtasks). 
From Figure 4, we observe that in non-real-time en-
vironments (real-time degree = 0), in EB1, EB2, and 
EB3, the difference in the negotiation outcome among 
the three approaches is insignificant. That is, with suf-
ficient negotiation time, the more flexible PI approach 
does not yield better negotiation outcome than does 
the confidence-based strategy or the purely-pipelined 
strategy. Furthermore, when the environment is less 
time-critical, especially when the environment is less 
dynamic and uncertain (e.g., in EB1, real-time degree 
is from 1 to 3), CB still fails to outperform PA. On one 
hand, the coalition-initiating agent in CB is more confi-
dent in its coalition candidates that it selects the pack-
aged approach more often. On the other hand, with 
relatively sufficient negotiation time and relatively fast 
response time, the pipelined approach does not yield 
better average negotiation outcome for the confidence-
based strategy. However, CB does perform as well or 
outperforms both PA and PI in all but one (i.e., EB1, 
real-time degree = 3) real-time environments, validat-
ing the confidence-based strategy that adaptively com-
bines the more opportunistic pipelined approach and 
the more efficient packaged approach to conduct mul-
tiple, concurrent negotiations effectively. 
Note that as the real-time constraints become more 
stringent, the negotiation outcomes in all the strategies 
deteriorate, as expected since there are more negotiations 
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aborted due to the time limits. Noticeably, CB’s perfor-
mance deteriorates at the slowest rate. This hints that 
(a) the confidence-based strategy is more robust than 
PA and PI, and (b) the strategy is able to make good 
decisions on when to use the packaged or pipelined 
negotiation approach appropriately.   
Unexpectedly, PA outperforms PI in terms of aver-
age negotiation outcome in most scenarios, especially 
when the real-time constraint is high. This is coun-
ter-intuitive because the pipelined negotiation ap-
proach is supposed to be more flexible and opportu-
nistic. Upon closer analysis, we realize that when a 
negotiation task is highly time-constrained, PI may not 
be able to negotiate all issues. In that case, being op-
portunistic does not necessarily pay off: if the negotia-
tions are not completed soon enough, the issues wait-
ing in the pipelines will not get a chance to be moved 
from a slower pipeline to a faster one. Thus, the advan-
tage of the pipelined approach lessens. On the other 
hand, by packaging issues into one single negotiation, 
the purely-packaged strategy can actually by chance 
complete negotiations within the imposed time limit 
for some tasks. Thus, we have found a cutoff point 
in terms of real-time degree above which the purely-
packaged strategy starts to outperform the purely-
pipelined strategy for the three different scenarios. 
Based on the above results and analysis, we see that 
(1) the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy 
can outperform the purely-pipelined strategy in ne-
gotiation outcome when the environment is time con-
strained; and (2) the adaptive, confidence-based nego-
tiation strategy can outperform the purely-packaged 
strategy in negotiation outcome when the environment 
is highly time-constrained but less dynamic and un-
certain, or when the time-constrained environment is 
more dynamic and uncertain. 
6. Conclusions and future work 
We have described an adaptive, confidence-based 
negotiation strategy in the problem domain of mul-
tiagent coalition formation. This strategy addresses 
multi-issue strategic negotiations in complex environ-
ments. In our strategy, an agent chooses a combination 
of pipelined and packaged approaches to conduct mul-
tiple, concurrent negotiations with its peers based on 
the agent’s confidence in its peer’s consistency. Our ex-
periments have found that the confidence-based strat-
egy generally outperforms the purely packaged and 
purely pipelined strategies in a variety of dynamic, 
uncertain, and real-time environments. We have also 
found a cutoff point where the strategy starts to lose 
ground to the purely packaged approach. Further, we 
have observed how the purely packaged approach can 
be more effective than the purely pipelined one in a 
highly dynamic and uncertain environment, when it 
is highly time-constrained. Our results are also sup-
ported by [2]. Note that the computation of the confi-
dence measure can be seen as a form of learning: an 
initiating agent’s assessment of a candidate’s capabil-
ity gained from a series of observations over time. Ex-
celente-Toledo and Jennings [2] showed that learning 
improves the decision making when agents are uncer-
Figure 4. Comparison on negotiation outcome in EB1, EB2, 
and EB3, from the less dynamic and uncertain to the more dy-
namic and uncertain environments. PA = purely packaged, PI 
= purely pipelined, and CB = confidence-based.  
Ad A p ti v e, c o n f i d e n c e-b AS e d S tr A teg i c n eg o ti A ti o n S i n c o mp L e X mu L ti A g en t e n v i r o n me n tS   325
tain about the other agents’ actions, and that learning 
is ineffective when agents operate in more static en-
vironments when compared to other agents that can 
make reasonably accurate predictions about their envi-
ronment and other agents. A key difference is that our 
agents make decisions to use the packaged or pipeline 
approach based on their confidence in what they have 
learned, instead of making decisions based directly on 
what they have learned. 
Our current and immediate work include conduct-
ing further experiments (1) with larger dynamism and 
uncertainty ranges to locate the cutoff point beyond 
which the purely pipelined strategy outperforms the 
confidence-based strategy, (2) with more agents and 
more issues (and more diverse capabilities) to study 
the rate of an agent in finally feeling the impact of 
the confidence-based strategy—presently, the experi-
ments were setup so that an agent was able to profile 
a peer’s consistency quite accurately after only a few 
tasks, and (3) with noise injected into the environment 
such as noise in communication (e.g., messages getting 
dropped) and the specification of tasks (e.g., issues 
change after receipt). 
Further, we look to improving the negotiation strat-
egy to address the uncertainty of the environment. 
How should the agents learn how to pick the right 
pipeline to which to move negotiation issues? Pres-
ently, the initiating agent simply opportunistically 
chooses the pipeline that is free and where the candi-
date is capable. However, a free pipeline and a capa-
ble candidate do not guarantee that the candidate will 
agree to handle the new issue. This is because, in a 
complex environment, an agent that is not busy now 
may become very busy in the next few moments, or a 
communication link that is fast now may become very 
congested and slow next. Based on the confidence 
that the initiating agent has in its candidates and past 
“transfer” utility, perhaps the agent can learn to be 
more conservative and patient against the uncertainty 
of the environment. This is the key to improve the 
quality of the coalition since the original assignment of 
subtasks (issues) to each candidate is deemed to be the 
best plan that the agent has derived during its coalition 
planning phase. 
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